The PE Deal Series · Post D.11
View the full series →The Fine Print That Costs Millions
How dollar-one baskets, long survival periods, and offset rights let buyers reduce the purchase price after the deal closes.
The purchase agreement was 127 pages. The indemnity section was 14 of them. Nobody on the founder's side read all 14 pages carefully. Those pages determined how much of the purchase price the buyer could claw back after closing.
Indemnification is the mechanism that lets a buyer reach back into a closed deal and take money off the table. Representations and warranties are the promises the seller makes about the business. When a rep turns out to be wrong, the indemnity clause determines who pays, how much, and for how long.
Most founders focus on the headline number. The fine print costs them millions.
The Warranty Card
You're selling your used car. The buyer wants a warranty — your guarantee that the engine runs, the frame is solid, the title is clean. Fair enough. If any of that turns out to be false, you make it right.
Then the buyer insists the warranty cover everything — the seats, the radio, the wipers, the cup holders. It runs for five years. There's no minimum claim size. And if a repair costs more than the car, the buyer can come after your house.
When you sell your business, the buyer insists on reps and warranties. A broad indemnity attaches to them — a long survival period, a dollar-one basket. Your exposure isn't capped at the purchase price. It's whatever the buyer decides to claim.
The Crossfield Fine Print
The Crossfield purchase agreement contained broad indemnification provisions. Three features made them buyer-favorable.
First, the basket. Indemnity agreements typically include an indemnification basket — a threshold below which the buyer can't make claims. The Crossfield deal had a $1 basket. Not $1M. One dollar. Every claim, no matter how small, was indemnifiable from the first dollar. No deductible. No minimum. Once breached, the buyer recovers from dollar one. It removes any friction from filing claims.
Second, survival periods. The reps and warranties survived closing for 24 months on general reps and 60 months on fundamental reps. Fundamental reps included tax, environmental, and employee benefits. For five years post-close, the founders were exposed to claims on topics they no longer controlled.
Third, offset rights. Ridgeline could offset indemnity claims against the seller notes and earnout payments. If Ridgeline identified a rep breach, they deducted the amount from the next payment. No separate process. No independent review. The claim became a deduction.
This created a compounding problem. In The Earnout Mirage, we explained how Ridgeline controlled the EBITDA calculation. The offset rights meant Ridgeline could also reduce earnout payments by claiming indemnity breaches. Two independent mechanisms, both controlled by the buyer, both reducing the same pool of founder money.
Ridgeline carried representations and warranties insurance (RWI). RWI is often pitched as founder protection — the insurance company pays claims instead of the seller. In practice, RWI changes buyer behavior. With insurance backing the claims, buyers have an incentive to file more aggressively. The threshold for what constitutes a "breach" drops. An aggressive buyer files more claims. The founders' exposure goes up, not down.
Deal Spectrum: 8/10
The left column shows what a founder-favorable version of this term looks like. The right column shows what Crossfield signed.
The mental model is the Clawback Machine. Indemnity isn't just about who's liable. It's about how easily the buyer converts a claim into a deduction. Dollar-one baskets, long survival, and offset rights turn the indemnity clause into a tool for reducing the purchase price after closing.
The Crossfield Moment
Seven months after closing, Ridgeline's compliance team identified a potential environmental issue at one of Crossfield's service sites. The estimated remediation cost was $340K. Under the $1 basket, the full amount was indemnifiable.
Ridgeline didn't send a check request. They sent a notice of offset against the next seller note interest payment.
James read the notice. The environmental rep survived for 60 months. The offset was automatic. The $340K would come out of money he and Dan were already counting on.
He looked at the stack of reps in the purchase agreement. Fourteen pages. Five years of exposure. And a buyer who could turn any claim into a deduction without asking.
Founder Protection Tips
Negotiate a true deductible basket. A deductible makes the buyer absorb the first $X of claims before recovering anything — not a dollar-one structure where they recover from the very first claim.
Shorten survival periods on general reps. Push for 12 months on general reps and resist anything beyond 36 months on fundamental reps — the more time that passes after closing, the harder it is to defend against a claim.
Don't let the buyer take their claims out of the money they still owe you. Indemnity claims should be paid from a defined pool — escrow or insurance proceeds — not deducted directly from your earnout or seller notes.
Negotiate a meaningful indemnity cap. Total indemnity exposure should be capped as a percentage of the purchase price, not left open-ended.
Push for independent verification of claims before deduction. No unilateral offsets — every claim should go through a defined dispute process with a neutral arbiter or agreed accounting firm.
Read before you sign.